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WHEN ARTISTS FAIL: A REPLY TO TRIVEDI
Sheila Lintott
In a recent article, ‘An Epistemic Dilemma for Actual Intentionalism’, Saam Trivedi
argues that the way we ought to interpret artworks is best understood using the model
proposed by hypothetical intentionalism. Trivedi alleges that actual intentionalism
faces a serious dilemma, the upshot of which is that actual intentionalists must choose
between redundancy and indeterminacy. Largely on the basis of this dilemma,
he concludes that even if actual intentionalism is descriptively accurate, it is
prescriptively untenable. In this essay, I focus on this alleged dilemma and argue that,
contra Trivedi, it fails to undermine the prescriptive legitimacy of moderate actual
intentionalism. That is, Trivedi’s dilemma does not offer us a good reason to refrain
from working to understand works of art under the methodological guidance of
actual intentionalism.

IN A recent article, ‘An Epistemic Dilemma for Actual Intentionalism’, Saam
Trivedi argues that the way we ought to interpret artworks is best understood on
the model proposed by hypothetical intentionalism.1 In support of this claim,
Trivedi alleges that actual intentionalism faces a serious dilemma, the upshot of
which is that actual intentionalists must choose between redundancy and
indeterminacy. Largely on the basis of this dilemma, Trivedi concludes that even
if actual intentionalism is descriptively accurate, it is prescriptively untenable.
Therefore, he concludes that ‘even if many interpreters currently follow [actual
intentionalism’s] recommendations, they should not do so’ (p. 201). I focus here
on this alleged dilemma and argue that, contra Trivedi, it fails to undermine the
prescriptive legitimacy of moderate actual intentionalism. That is, Trivedi’s
dilemma does not offer us a good reason to refrain from working to understand
works of art under the methodological guidance of actual intentionalism.
Trivedi’s opponents in this piece are Noël Carroll and proponents of his brand
of moderate actual intentionalism. Carroll’s moderate actual intentionalism relies
in particular on a conception of art as a mode of communication, or, as Carroll
puts it, conversation.2 Trivedi’s precise disagreement with Carroll involves the
relationship between actual intentionalism and an understanding of art as a mode
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of communication. Carroll thinks that the two are related, such that if it is true
that our interest in artworks is often (usually) a conversational one, then we
should agree that moderate actual intentionalism is the best theory of art
interpretation. Trivedi agrees that our interest in artworks is adequately described
as an interest in communication, but he disagrees that accepting such an interest
as basic necessarily commits one to actual intentionalism. However, Trivedi
presents the epistemic dilemma as a problem for all moderate actual intentionalists—philosophers who, according to Trivedi, restrict the scope of actual
intentionalist interpretation to successful artworks.3 In Trivedi’s sense, a successful artwork is one in which the artist’s semantic intentions have been realized or
embodied in the work.
The alleged dilemma relies on two claims. First, as I have said, on the claim
that moderate actual intentionalists recommend their method of interpretation
only for those artworks in which the artist has been successful. Secondly, Trivedi
points out that artists sometimes fail to incorporate their semantic intentions in
their work, so that the work ends up meaning something other than what its artist
intended it to mean. To illustrate, Trivedi offers the ‘simple example’ of a sculptor
who tries to make a curvaceous statue, but produces an angular-looking one
instead (p. 196).
These claims, however, are questionable. In particular, it is reasonable to
question the accuracy of Trivedi’s representation of moderate actual intentionalism, his conception of artistic success, and also the theory of artistic intention to
which he appeals. I consider these aspects of Trivedi’s account and argue that they
are inaccurate. Once these inaccuracies are cleared up, it will be plain to see that
Trivedi’s alleged epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism is no dilemma at
all. Before presenting my argument, I shall first state the dilemma as a whole. In
my reconstruction of it, it runs as follows:
1.

2.

3.

3

‘For any given artwork, either the artist’s semantic intentions about
work-meaning have been successfully embodied in it, or else they have not
been successfully embodied in it’ (pp. 197–198).
In order to figure out whether the artist’s semantic intentions have been
realized or not, we must check whether there is a fit between the workmeaning and the semantic intentions of the artist.
In order to figure out if there is a fit between work-meaning and the artist’s

Trivedi refers to Robert Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State Press, 1997) and Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton
U.P., 1987), but a complete list would also include (at least) Noël Carroll, ‘Intention and
Interpretation: The Debate Between Actual and Hypothetical Intentionalists’, Metaphilosophy
vol. 31 no. 1/2 (2000), pp. 75–95 and Gary Iseminger, ‘Actual vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism’,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism vol. 54, no. 4 (1996), pp. 319–326.
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semantic intentions, we must find the work-meaning independently of the
artist’s semantic intentions.
If there is no fit, then we can conclude that the artist’s semantic intentions
have not been realized.
If there is a fit, we can conclude that the artist’s semantic intentions have
been realized.
But, if we can figure out the work-meaning without referring to the artist’s
actual intentions, then we do not need the artist’s semantic intentions to
interpret the work.
And, if we cannot figure out work-meaning without referring to the artist’s
actual intentions, then we will not know whether the artist succeeded, nor
will we know whether to approach the work as actual intentionalists or not.

Trivedi concludes that the actual intentionalist is compelled to choose between
redundancy (6) as the one horn and indeterminacy (7) as the other horn of this
epistemic dilemma. For if we can discern what the artwork means independently
of an appeal to the semantic intentions of the artist, then such intentions are
unnecessary to discern artwork meaning. On the other hand, if we cannot discern
what the artwork means independently of knowing successfully realized semantic
intentions, then it seems that we cannot tell if the artist has been successful. In
cases where we cannot distinguish successful from unsuccessful artworks, since
moderate actual intentionalists limit the scope of actual intentionalism to
successful artworks, we do not know whether to resort to actual intentionalism or
something else, perhaps hypothetical intentionalism. Thus, the issue at stake,
according to Trivedi, concerns whether we, as audience members, can tell
whether or not an artist has been successful and thus whether actual intentionalism is applicable.
However, Trivedi misconstrues moderate actual intentionalism. Moderate
actual intentionalists do not hold that only successful works of art are proper
subjects of actual intentionalist interpretation. The view is importantly different
from this; it is rather that of the artist’s intentions, only those that the work can
have—express, embody, support—are truly relevant to a correct interpretation of
the work. I take this to be is what Stecker means when he says that ‘we can avoid
attributing to works what an artist unsuccessfully intends to do in it by stipulating
that only what an artist successfully intends (i.e. intentionally does) is part of
what a work means’4, and what Iseminger means when he says that the ‘meaning
of a . . . work is that meaning intended by the author which is compatible with
the [work]’.5 So, contra Trivedi’s suggestion, actual intentionalists are not
required to discern ahead of time or even during early encounters with an artwork
4
5
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whether the artist has succeeded or not. Rather, the recommendation is, as far as
I can tell, that we approach the artwork with the idea in mind that the artist has
been at least partially successful in realizing her semantic intentions in the work
and that we try to understand the work accordingly.
To explain further the point I am now trying to make, it is worthwhile to note
that actual and hypothetical intentionalists agree on much regarding how we
should interpret artworks. In fact, both admit that the intentions are relevant to a
correct interpretation of the work, but they differ over the nature of those
intentions (actual or hypothesized) and the degree to which intentions are
relevant (authoritative or suggestive). Importantly, both focus primarily on the
work itself. In addition to attending to the work itself, both consider (among
other things) the context in which the work is presented, previous and perhaps
subsequent works by the same artist, the climate of the times in which the artist
worked, and the artist’s public persona—including religious and political
convictions. In practice, the major difference between actual and hypothetical
intentionalists really amounts to this: if we were to learn with certainty that an
artist intended a certain meaning and it is a meaning the work can have, then the
actual intentionalist accepts it as the best meaning of the work. The hypothetical
intentionalist, who views the artist simply as one critic among many, will only
admit that the artist’s intended meaning is one of a number of possible
interpretations and will deny that it is necessarily the best one. In other words,
the hypothetical intentionalist searches for the best hypothesis of artistically
intended meaning where ‘best’ is understood as being the artistically superior
interpretation of those the artist could have intended.6 So, an actual intentionalist
will bypass an interpretation if it is one that the artist could have intended, but we
know that she actually did not. But if the interpretation is artistically superior to
other possibly or actually intended interpretations, then a hypothetical intentionalist may accept it.
Trivedi recommends that ‘irrespective of whether the artist’s intentions have
succeeded or not, in experiencing and understanding artworks correctly, we
should seek correct work-meaning primarily and not the artist’s intentions’
(p. 200). Moderate actual intentionalists agree, while maintaining that correct
work-meaning is not independent of artistic intent. Noël Carroll points this out
when he explains that ‘for the modest actual intentionalist, close interpretive
attention to the text is just the pursuit of the actual intentions of the artist; it is an
error to think of close attention to the text and the search for actual intentions as
opposed enterprises’.7 This explains how premise (2)—in order to figure out
whether the artist’s semantic intentions have been realized or not, we must check
6
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whether there is a fit between the work-meaning and the semantic intentions of
the artist—is misleading. It is misleading because it suggests that work-meaning
and artistically intended meaning are necessarily two logically distinct entities,
but the moderate actual intentionalist does not accept this: the moderate actual
intentionalist holds that the meaning of an artwork is the meaning of the work
that the artist intended it to have, provided that such meaning is compatible with
or supported by the work itself. The main tenet of moderate actual intentionalism
is that the work is what it is and means what it means largely, although not
exclusively, due to what the artist intended it to be and to mean. From my
discussion of this view, it should be clear that it is not as if the actual intentionalist
needs some way to sort out the successful from the unsuccessful artworks prior
to attempting to correctly experience and understand the work. Therefore, rather
than:
1.

‘For any given artwork, either the artist’s semantic intentions about workmeaning have been successfully embodied in it, or else they have not been
successfully embodied in it’ (pp. 197–198)

the first premise of the alleged dilemma should read:
1′. For any given semantic intention, either it has been successfully embodied in
the work or it has not been successfully embodied in the artwork.
From (1′) we can see the focus of the next step should not concern determining
whether the artwork as a whole embodies (all of) the artist’s semantic intentions.
Instead, the next concern should be over how to tell whether any given intention
has been successfully realized in the work or not. But there is no epistemic
dilemma involved in this determination. We can accomplish this by simply
considering the various meanings the work could have and considering if one
(or more) of them amounts to an embodiment, realization, or expression of the
semantic intention in question. If so, then we have arrived at what the work—or
at least part of it—does mean. If not, then either we have failed to notice a possible
interpretation and should add it in order to accommodate the artist’s intent,8 or
else we could conclude that the artist has failed to realize that particular semantic
intention.
8

Notice that this is a case where what the artist tells us about her intentions helps us to see
something in the work. Admitting that this is possible, however, does not commit us to the
extreme actual intentionalist view that artwork meaning is simply identical to the meaning its artist
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attention to some aspect(s) of the work allowed us to understand the work in a new way. This is
not very mysterious, and critics often affect our experience of a work by pointing out or
emphasizing certain aspects of it.
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Perhaps Trivedi would respond by saying that looking for the artist’s intentions
in an unsuccessful artwork is a waste of time, since they are not there. Therefore,
the fact that artists can fail is clear evidence that we should avoid actual
intentionalist interpretation, and opt instead to follow the hypothetical
intentionalist method. Trivedi’s straightforward claim that artists sometimes fail
is uncontroversial. But the degree of failure necessary to make actual intentionalism a waste of time is so great that I am sceptical that it ever unintentionally
occurs.
The claim that an artist either succeeds or fails to realize her semantic
intentions in her work, upon which Trivedi’s dilemma rests, presents us with a
false dichotomy. Absolute success and absolute failure are not the only alternatives here. Moreover, it is rarely, if ever, the case that an artist in fact completely fails
to express, realize, or embody her semantic intentions in her work.
I submit that successfully realized intentions are frequently, in art and
elsewhere, a matter of degree. This is partly because intentions themselves are
complicated and also because it is rarely, if ever, the case that an artist has one
simple semantic intention. As Wollheim points out, artistic intentions are
properly understood as follows.
‘Intention’ best picks out just those desires, thoughts, beliefs, experiences, emotions,
commitments, which cause the artist to paint as he does. A further cause of error has
been to think that these mental phenomena, in order to exercise causal power, have
to be assembled into some inner picture which is a complete facsimile of the picture
to be. No total preconception of the picture that is independent of all the engagement
with the medium is a serious possibility.9

It seems to me that Trivedi has made just this mistake. In thinking that none of
an artist’s intentions are relevant to the interpretation of her work if she fails to
achieve one desired aspect, he draws too narrow a field for artistic intention.
While absolute success and absolute failure are at opposite poles on a spectrum of
artistic achievement, they are not the only options. Rather than simply succeed or
fail, an artist can succeed, fail, or hit a mark somewhere in between. Given the
complex nature of artistic intentions (and any intention) and the variables
involved in the execution of that intention, the possibility of partial success seems
by far the most likely. For all but cases of total failure, it is reasonable to think that
we can frequently find evidence in a work of partially to wholly realized artistic
intent.
Therefore, what we find is not the meaning of the work independent of the
meaning its artist intended. Rather, we focus our attention primarily on the work
and in doing so find evidence of artistic success. It might be the case that an
artist’s work fails to capture every detail exactly as she wished, but how such
9
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failure amounts to a complete failure I cannot see. As Carroll has pointed out,
we can find evidence of failed intentions within a work,10 and so too can we
see evidence of partially realized intentions. This is so because, as neoW ittgensteinians such as Colin Lyas argue, intentions are not causes that lie
completely outside of their effects.11 Moreover, it is highly unlikely for an artist to
completely fail to realize her semantic intentions. Artists can fail, and can fail
drastically.12 Nonetheless, my suspicion is that cases of drastic failure, say making
an artwork pink instead of blue,13 are extremely rare. But even drastic failure is
not the same thing as complete artistic failure, as drastic failure need not be a case
in which none of the artist’s semantic intentions have been realized. This is why
comments such as, ‘I see what the artist was trying to do here’, are frequently
uttered by critics and audience members alike; and even if such sentiments are
followed by claims that the artist did not completely achieve the desired effect,
the claim makes perfect sense.
Trivedi might refer in his defence to his own example and argue that we
cannot tell, for example, whether the artist intended the sculpture to be
curvaceous or angular simply by looking at the artwork in the gallery. We
need two independent notions of meaning—artwork-meaning and artistically
intended—and only then can we tell, via comparison, whether the artist has
succeeded. But this response only serves to highlight the problem. Trivedi’s
statue is analogous to something like a completely failed conversation: a conversation, that is, in which there are no clues of what the interlocutors intended
to say to be found in what they did say. But does this not sound like an extremely
unlikely occurrence? What would have to be the state of mind of an individual
whose words bear no relation to the meaning she intended to convey? Unless we
are dealing with either a case of trickery or a case of someone who lacks (all of)
the requisite language skills, then it seems we would call into question the sanity
of the individual.
Trivedi’s example of the curvaceously intended but angular-looking sculpture
does not help his case, as the likes of it are rarely seen in practice. Moreover,
although this may seem like a case of complete artistic failure, i.e. where the artist
has failed to embody her semantic intentions in the work, it is not clear that it is
such a failure. What are the properties of a sculpture? Size, shape, texture, colour,
sheen. The sculptor in Trivedi’s example has missed somehow in the execution
of his intention to make the sculpture curvaceous, but perhaps the sculptor has
got some or all of the rest of it right. If this is the case, then those intentions are
10
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relevant to the interpretation of the sculpture. There is no reason to think that all
of an artist’s intentions need to be realized in order for some of her intentions to
be relevant to the interpretation of her work.14
In sum, contra Trivedi, I have argued that actual intentionalists need not be
able to tell whether an artist has successfully realized her semantic intentions
before experiencing and interpreting the work. The pertinent issue is whether a
given intention is relevant, not whether the artist has fully succeeded or not.
Secondly, if need be, I have argued that we can tell if an artist has fulfilled some
of her semantic intentions without appealing to the two separate notions of
artwork-meaning and artistically intended meaning. And although we can find
many good and convincing clues in the work itself of artistic intent, frequently
information gleaned from artists can tell us even more about the work. Hence,
the alleged dilemma has been dissolved. Now we see it should read as follows:
1′. For any given semantic intention, either it has been successfully embodied in
the work or it has not been successfully embodied in the work.
2′. In order to figure out whether one of the artist’s semantic intentions has been
realized or not, we must check whether there is a fit between what the work
could mean and that semantic intention of the artist.
3′. In order to figure out whether there is a fit between what the work could
mean and that semantic intention of the artist, we must find out what the
work could mean and then discern whether the artist’s semantic intention is
compatible with one (or more) of the things the work could mean.
4′. If no possible meaning of the work is compatible with or supports the
semantic intention in question, then we can conclude that the artist’s
semantic intention has not been realized.
5′. If there is a possible meaning of the work that is compatible with or supports
the semantic intention in question, then we can conclude that the artist’s
semantic intention has been realized.
However, the problems that Trivedi claims follow from his dilemma no longer
follow. For, if (4′) the intention is incompatible with or unsupported by the work,
then
6′. We can conclude that this particular intention is not relevant to the
interpretation of the artwork.
14

And, as Carroll points out (speaking of Beardsley’s example of a pink statue that was allegedly
intended by the artist to be blue), we might legitimately question whether the sculptor in question
is being honest when she reports that she intended the sculpture to be curvaceous. It seems
doubtful that she is, and actual intentionalists are not interested in insincere or ignorant reports
about artistic intentions; rather, they are interested in the artist’s actual intentions, whether she
admits them or not (Carroll ‘Art, Intention, and Conversation’, p. 99).
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And if (5') the intention is compatible with or supported by the work, then
7′. We can conclude that this particular intention is relevant to the interpretation
of the artwork.
Therefore, contra Trivedi’s allegations, there is no redundancy and no
indeterminacy. There is no redundancy because looking for work-meaning and
looking for the artist’s actual intentions are not two distinct procedures. There is
no indeterminacy because we know how to tell if a given intention is compatible with the work, which is all we need to do. In short, the question the actual
intentionalist needs to answer is not which of all artworks are the successful ones,
but rather which of the artist’s intentions are successfully embodied in the work.
The actual intentionalist stands to learn about the work by learning about its
genesis and to enrich their understanding of the work by communing with the
artist responsible for it being what and how it is. The artist’s intentions are
therefore not redundant, and looking for them does not confront us with any
indeterminacy.15
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